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1  Introduction
Globalization—the integration of national economies--has become one of the most widely used
buzzwords of the late 20
th century.  It is frequently given credit or blame for all manner of
economic outcomes.  While many signs of globalization are quite obvious, it is hard to say whether
market integration is more important for economic performance today than it was thirty years ago.
But one thing is certain: Few people have done more to advance our understanding of the manifold
dimensions of economic integration than Robert Lipsey. Lipsey and numerous co-authors have
chronicled market integration in all its dimensions--the behavior of relative prices, national price
levels, volume flows of traded goods, and volume flows of foreign direct investment--in as much
detail as anyone.  As a result, much of what we know about the extent of international economic
integration is due to him.  In this paper we try to make a further contribution to that understanding,
particularly in the area of the integration of markets for traded goods.
What drives globalization?  In financial markets, integration has been driven by declines in both
natural and political trade barriers.  For example, the proliferation of computer technology has
drastically cheapened trading and communication; at the same time, policy makers have eliminated
a wide range of restrictions on international capital flows.  The results are clear in terms of both
quantities and prices.  In 1973 the daily turnover in worldwide foreign-exchange trading averaged
about $10 billion; today this quantity has increased more than a hundred fold to well over $1
trillion.  And across many countries, covered interest parity holds much more closely today than it
did 20 years ago.  In light of this evidence on both quantities and prices, there is a consensus that
financial markets are much more integrated today than they were 20 years ago.
Many of the same forces driving financial-market integration have also been operating in goods
markets, so it is tempting to conclude that product markets have integrated as well.  Natural trade
barriers have fallen with improvements in transportation such as supertankers and wide-body jets.
On the political side, successive General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rounds have
greatly reduced tariffs on manufactures and have expanded the scope of liberalization to many non-
manufacturing sectors as well.  In addition to multilateral liberalization, many countries have also2
lowered barriers through regional arrangements such as the European Union (EU) and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Other factors have been working against product-market integration, however.  First, the
many regional trading blocs which have formed in recent years can divert trade as well as create it.
Second, as tariff barriers have declined, many countries have increasingly resorted to non-tariff
barriers (NTBs) to impede trade.  Arrangements such as the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) and
"voluntary" export restraints in the U.S. automobile market have proliferated.   The aggressive use
of antidumping laws to protect domestic industries is common in the United States and Europe.
Recent complaints levied by U.S. steel makers remind us of the importance of these tools in
restricting the flow of goods and distorting prices.  Rough measures of the existence of NTBs are
available, such as coverage ratios.  But these measures do little to gauge the extent to which NTBs
actually inhibit trade.  Unlike tariff rates, they do not tell us how great a wedge is created between
prices of similar goods in different markets.  Overall, with the decline of natural trade barriers and
tariffs on the one hand and the rise of regional blocs NTBs on the other, it is difficult to say a priori
just how much more integrated product-markets have become in recent years.1
In this paper we present some new price- and quantity-based measures of product-market
integration.  Documenting trends in market integration is interesting in itself.  But it will also help
us understand the link between countries' trade policies and their economic performance.  Do
countries grow faster as their product markets become more connected to those of other countries?
Has product-market integration contributed to rising income inequality in countries?  By studying
product-market integration in multiple dimensions--across countries, industries, and time--we hope
to assemble some facts on integration that will permit more powerful tests of the impact of
integration on national economic performance.
This paper is organized as follows.  Section two discusses the process of economic integration
and its implications for economic outcomes.  Section three presents our data and framework for
1Widely available volume measures, such as (trade/GDP) ratios, may really reflect something about the nature of economic
growth rather than the integration of product markets.  Harrigan (1993) provides direct evidence on how much trade barriers
reduce import volumes.  Using a 1983 sample of OECD countries, he finds that tariffs and transportation costs reduce import
volumes much more than NTBs do.3
analyzing product price evidence on integration.  Section four presents our data and framework for
analyzing quantity evidence on integration. Section five concludes.
2  Perspectives on Economic Integration
Before discussing the conceptual issues that underlie the measurement of product market
integration, it is worth remembering why we care about this integration in the first place.
Economic integration has many consequences for the operation of a market economy.  First, it can
affect an economy's response to monetary and fiscal policies.  In each case, tighter connections
between domestic and foreign markets can reduce the potency of conventional demand stimuli.
For example, increased lending by domestic banks or increased spending by domestic consumers
may be directed at foreign firms.  Second, greater integration can allow external factors to exert
greater influence on domestic outcomes.  For example, increased product-market competition from
less-developed countries might be contributing to the ongoing rise in the U.S. skill premium.  The
exact degree to which economic integration affects domestic outcomes remains open to speculation,
however.  In part, this is because we have only rough metrics by which to measure the extent of
integration, especially in product markets.  Our paper aims to provide some new measures.
Broadly speaking, there are two ways to proceed in measuring product-market integration.
One approach would be to assemble direct evidence on the magnitude of barriers between national
markets.  Included here would be shipping costs, tariffs, and any other barriers that make costly
the international movement of goods.  In general, we expect the degree of market integration will
vary inversely with the magnitude of these barriers.
Available data on tariff rates and transport costs certainly confirm the view that markets have
become more integrated in recent years.  Figure 1 presents some evidence of declining U.S.
barriers.  Average tariff rates cover all U.S. manufacturing imports; each year's rate measures the
total tariff revenue collected divided by the value of all dutiable imports.  Average transportation
costs also cover all U.S. manufacturing; each year's rate measures the cost, insurance, and freight
for all U.S. imports divided by the value (excluding the shipping costs) of all imports.  These data
come from Feenstra (1996).  As Figure 1 shows, average U.S. tariffs and transportation costs4
have generally been declining the past 20 years.  This suggests that U.S. product markets have
become more integrated with world markets.
These direct measures of integration are suggestive, but they face at least three important
limitations.  First, these ex post measures omit the cost of prohibitive barriers -- i.e., tariffs or
transportation costs that are so high that U.S. imports are zero.  Second, these tariff measures
completely omit all NTBs.  This matters because NTBs, both intended and unintended, are now
the primary barrier between countries in many product categories.  Third, even if NTB data were
readily available they likely could not be easily quantified as a cost of moving goods.  Details of
NTBs vary so much by product that it would be hard to systematically assemble such information.
On all counts, these measures may overstate the degree of product-market integration.
These limitations suggest the need for an alternative approach to measuring economic
integration.  This is to examine equilibrium outcomes—the prices and quantities generated in
various markets—to see if they are consistent with a marked change in the magnitude of barriers
separating national markets for goods.  For example, price equalization for a good would suggest
that trade barriers for that good had been eliminated.  This is the approach we use in this paper.
One advantage of this approach is that, relative to measuring barriers, measuring outcomes
offers more hope for comparability of data across countries, product categories, and time, thanks
in part to the efforts of Robert Lipsey through initiatives such as the International Comparisons
Project (ICP) and the NBER World Trade Flows Database.  For efforts to measure globalization
across lots of dimensions, this advantage is particularly important.  One disadvantage of this
approach is it does not link outcomes back to barriers.  Without these links one cannot rule out that
changes in outcomes are caused by forces other than declining barriers, such as economic growth.
Increased trade flows among a set of countries might be caused by declining trade barriers.  As
Helpman (1987) has shown, however, it might also be caused by convergence of country
incomes--caused in turn by forces like technological convergence or factor accumulation.  We
acknowledge this disadvantage of outcome-based measures, yet point out that for many important
issues outcome-based integration matters independent of the cause(s).  For example, if changes in5
a country's relative product prices are raising domestic wage inequality, that outcome is the same
for workers whether caused by reduced transportation costs or by growth abroad.
To date, most descriptions of product-market integration have focused on trade volumes rather
than trade prices.2  However, in standard models trade benefits a country both by compelling its
producers to reallocate resources across industries and by presenting its consumers with an
improved range of options.  The mechanism which generates these gains is a change in the vector
of tradable-goods prices facing the country.  As these prices come to match those of the world, a
country benefits by specializing in its comparative-advantage goods and exporting them in
exchange for the rest of the world's comparative-advantage goods.  The potential benefits of facing
world prices are not limited to these gains from reallocating resources.  At least three additional
gains from facing world prices arise in some models:  reduced market power for firms and thus
smaller price-cost margins in the imperfect-competition models from new trade theory; higher firm
productivity via reduced X-inefficiencies; and greater capital accumulation.  Thus, trade theory
makes clear that an important--if not the most important--aspect of goods-market integration is
facing world prices of traded goods.
While it may be true that prices carry the important economic signals associated with increased
market integration, it is also true that in most cases, these signals will lead firms and consumers to
make new allocation decisions.  The patterns of production and consumption (and thus, of imports
and exports) are almost certain to change in concert with the change in prices.  Therefore, it is of
great interest to look at quantity data as well in assessing the changing extent of economic
integration across countries.
Given our decision to measure integration with price and quantity outcomes, it is important to
clarify how reductions in natural and political trade barriers change these equilibrium outcomes.
To do this we outline these changes from two alternative perspectives.  The first is the standard
Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model in which the key determinant of trade is international differences in
relative factor endowments.  In the textbook two-good setup, we imagine one country specializes
2 See, for example, Krugman (1995) or Irwin (1996).  Another popular strain of the literature on integration relies on
gravity models of trade volumes.6
in cars and the other in shirts, and they trade to satisfy their preferences.  When barriers fall,
countries specialize more in production (production becomes more dissimilar across the countries)
and trade more with each other.  Our second perspective also presumes endowment differences,
but here the product space actually evolves as a result of the opportunity to trade.  The production
of the car may become fragmented into car components.  The country that specializes in shirts may
now make the fabric for the car seats.  The country that specialized in cars may now make the
machines that make shirts. We call this second model "HO Plus Production Fragmentation."3
Feenstra (1998, p.13) describes this model as characterized by "the increased use of imported
[intermediate] inputs, and narrowing of production activities within each country."
In both models, declining trade barriers permit production reorganization according to
comparative advantage.  In the standard model, there is no real distinction between “industries” and
“activities”.  In the modified model, the distinction is quite important.  Specialization occurs on the
basis of comparative advantage in activities.  This distinction matters because data are organized by
industry, rather than activity.  As a result, the normal patterns of specialization by industry, that
seem natural from the perspective of the standard HO model, may not arise in the data if vertical
specialization is occurring within industries according to activity. In the rest of this section we
briefly discuss these differences.  We start with prices.
First, consider prices charged to various destination markets by exporters in a particular source
country.  With integration, price dispersion across destination markets should decline over time in
the standard HO world.  This follows from the Law of One Price (LOP).  As barriers preventing
cross-country arbitrage decline, a particular source country must charge increasingly uniform
prices to destination markets.  In the HO-fragmentation world things are less clear because
integration can change the activity composition of exports.  For example, initially a country might
export fully assembled cars. Declining barriers might lead the country to export partially assembled
cars to certain markets and fully assembled cars to other markets.  If there are destination-specific
3 What we are calling fragmentation has been labeled differently by various authors: “kaleidoscope comparative advantage”
(Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994)), “slicing the value chain” (Krugman (1995)), and “delocalization” (Leamer (1998)).7
differences in goods arising as a result of specialization by activity, then price dispersion across
destinations need not decline.  In fact, it could easily increase.
Second, consider relative price structure for producer goods within each country.  With
integration, the relative price structure should become more similar across countries over time in
the standard HO world.  Again, this follows from the LOP.  But in the HO-fragmentation world,
relative producer prices need not become more similar across countries.  Industry-level producer
prices might actually become less similar across countries as the mix of activities within each
industry becomes less similar across countries thanks to greater specialization by activity.
Third, consider relative consumer prices for final goods (across all industries) within each
country.  If consumers worldwide share similar tastes for consumption in terms of industries, then
integration should make these relative prices more similar across countries.  Note this is true even
from the HO-fragmentation perspective.  Within-industry activities matter for price dispersion in
intermediate goods, but not for final goods.
We now consider how integration from these two perspectives affects quantities, both of trade
and production.  In a multilateral world, with either standard HO or HO-fragmentation we expect
to see rising trade "incidence" in terms of the frequency of bilateral trade flows for each industry.
However, in the standard HO world all this trade would be interindustry trade while in the HO-
fragmentation world much of it would be intraindustry trade of activities within industries.
Production patterns should also look different across the two perspectives.  In the standard HO
world, if countries focus production on comparative-advantage industries then the vector of output
shares should grow more dissimilar across countries over time for given factor endowments.  In
the HO-fragmentation world, however, the product mix might grow more similar across countries
over time.  Consider the example of automobile production for these two cases.  With integration
in the standard HO model, countries with a comparative-advantage in automobiles would increase
their automobile share of domestic production, while countries with a comparative-disadvantage
would reduce their automobile share.  But in the HO-fragmentation world most (perhaps all)
countries move into some aspect of car production:  different countries focus on different activities,8
but many might have at least some output in the car industry.  Another different feature of the HO-
fragmentation world is that the share of domestic value added in industry gross output might fall
across industries and countries as countries increasingly rely on imported intermediate inputs.  The
standard HO world does not carry this prediction.
In general, the predicted effects of integration on industry-level data are less clear for the HO-
fragmentation model than for the standard HO model.  While this is not a new idea, it is an
important empirical consideration because most readily available international data are at high
enough levels of aggregation to mask particular activities.  Feenstra (1998) provides rich anecdotal
and systematic evidence that production fragmentation has increased in recent years.
3  Evidence from Prices
The absolute version of LOP provides one natural benchmark for assessing the integration of
markets.  Presumably, globalization would reduce the magnitude of deviations from LOP.
Another benchmark might involve relative prices:  globalization should force countries to face
increasingly similar relative-price vectors for traded goods.  This definition might be attractive in
instances where misalignments of exchange rates might generate substantial short-run deviations
from absolute or relative LOP.
The usefulness of these benchmarks are limited by data constraints, however.  There are no
comprehensive data on local currency prices of identical products across countries.  Thus, any
attempt to measure integration using product prices will typically require a compromise in one of
the three dimensions emphasized above: comprehensiveness, unit of measure (e.g., comparing
measures such as indices whose levels are arbitrary), or product differentiation.  Although much
research has tested the relative LOP (e.g., Kravis and Lipsey (1977)), most of this work says
nothing about the changing degree of integration.  Somewhat ironically, the movement from
segmented to integrated markets would appear in the data as a departure from the relative LOP (or,
alternatively, as pricing to market).  In general, it is difficult to study price convergence with
indices--which contain no information about price levels.9
3a  The Behavior of Deviations from the Law of One Price
It may seem obvious that deviations from LOP should be decreasing as markets integrate, but it
is less clear whether what matters are absolute or relative (i.e., percentage) deviations from LOP.
Therefore, it worth considering what price dispersion actually reveals about integration.
Theoretically, price discrimination across markets arises as a result of: (1) differences in
demand characteristics across groups of consumers (where in our case the groups refer to
countries) and (2) the ability of firms to exploit differences in demand because of costs of resale
across markets.  Our definition of increased market integration is that the costs of resale are falling
relative to other costs in the economy, either because nations have reduced barriers to the free flow
of goods across borders or because transport and information costs have decreased between
markets.4  These definitions of price discrimination and market integration have important
consequences for measurement and interpretation.
First, it is important to recognize that the degree of price dispersion we observe in the data is
not purely a function of market integration.  Variation in demand elasticities due to underlying
variation in fundamentals such as income, exchange rates, or availability of substitutes can give
rise to variation in price dispersion as well.  Unfortunately, the precise link between these
fundamental factors and the dispersion in demand elasticities is likely to be quite complicated and
difficult to discern in the amount of data we have available.  We will make no explicit attempt to
control for them, but merely note their potential impact on our findings.
Second, it is important to account for the fact that resale costs may be rising in nominal terms,
but falling relative to other costs.  Ideally, we would like to know whether the permissible range of
price dispersion is rising or falling relative to the product price itself.  To capture this concept we
will use the coefficient of variation (CV), which equals the standard deviation of the prices across
countries within a given period divided by the mean of prices across countries for that period.  A
falling CV will be interpreted as falling resale costs and increased integration.
4 It is important to measure resale costs relative to other costs in order to abstract from the effects of inflation.10
We study the dispersion of prices across markets and over time for four different types of price
data: German export unit values, U.S. export unit values, the Big Mac, and The Economist.   Each
of these samples has nominal prices, converted if necessary into units of a common currency. The
data samples vary in the length of time they span and the destinations they include, although in
general these data measure prices in OECD countries only.  It is more difficult to get comparable
price data in nominal currency units for many of the less developed economies.  For evidence on
integration between the developed and less developed countries, which has arguably been a more
important phenomenon in recent decades, we will turn to quantity data in the next section.
Table 1 reports the estimated linear trend in the CVs calculated for each of 16 U.S. export unit
value series from 1973-87.  For each industry, the CV is calculated for each year across the set of
destinations in the sample.  Then the time series of CVs for that industry are regressed on a
constant and a linear time trend.  The cross section of destination markets includes between 5-8
countries, typically including Canada, Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom plus one or more
other European markets.  Because the set of destinations is not fixed across products, the variation
in results across industries may partly reflect variation in the markets in the sample.  If price
dispersion were declining steadily, we would expect the regression to yield a negative coefficient.
In fact, only four of the 16 estimates are negative and only two of them are significant at
conventional levels.  About four of the positive coefficients are statistically significant.
Table 2 reports the analogous regressions for 29 German export industries from 1975-87.  The
cross section of destinations is similar to that in the U.S. sample, except that the U.S. replaces
Germany as a destination in each industry.  In this sample, a small majority, 16 out of 29, cases
show a declining trend, although only five t-statistics are below -2.20 which is required for
statistical significance at the 5% level for a two tailed test with 11 degrees of freedom.  In contrast,
nine out of 13 positive coefficients are statistically significant.  One factor that may help explain the
number of significant positive coefficients in this set of regression is the overvaluation of the dollar
in the second half of the data sample.  In general, DM prices of shipments to the U.S. rose sharply
relative to the DM prices of shipments to other markets during the dollar’s rise from 1980-85.11
However, in repeating the regressions excluding the U.S. from the sample of German export
destinations, similar qualitative results were obtained.  Therefore, it is clear that the overvaluation
of the dollar was not by itself responsible for the significant trend increase in price dispersion
across German export markets.
One problem with the results for the U.S. and German exports is that in each case the data are
based on unit values of shipments.  The unit-value data are susceptible to quality change.  If
product varieties have become more specialized in a destination-specific manner over time, this
may account for increasing dispersion in unit values (see Lipsey (1963) for detailed analysis of
these issues).  Arbitrage forces are not as strong when product substitutability is low.  While there
are no comprehensive data on identical products, it is quite easy to get price data for the Big Mac
and The Economist (cover or newsstand price) on a local currency basis for a number of markets.
While Big Macs and The Economist do not strike people as classical “tradables” for which
trade arbitrages away international price differentials, there are still good reasons to expect that
prices for these goods should converge as a result of market integration.  First, many of the inputs
used in producing a Big Mac (flour, beef) or a magazine (paper) are in fact tradable goods.  As
these prices converge across countries, prices of the final goods should as well.  Second, if
product-market integration induces factor-price convergence across countries, then we have further
reason to think the prices of these goods might converge across markets.
What do these data show us about price dispersion?  Results for the Big Mac prices are
reported in Table 3 for three different samples.  The first sample uses prices from 12 different
markets, but excludes the 1987 observation (which is missing for half of these markets).  The
regression shows a slight, but insignificant tendency for dispersion to fall over time for the ten
annual data points.  If we restrict the sample to the six markets for which prices are available in all
11 periods, there is an increase in the estimated convergence trend, but the coefficient is still not
statistically significant. Finally, if we exclude the U.S. from the sample of six, the remaining five
markets—Belgium, U.K., France, Netherlands, and Germany—do show a significant trend12
toward lower dispersion.  This might be expected since European integration is taking hold over
this period and exchange rates are perhaps more tightly linked.
Results for The Economist are in Table 4.  These data cover the longest time span of any of our
data: 1967-1991.  The whole sample of 11 markets shows little evidence of trend.  This result does
not change markedly when the U.S. is excluded.  When the U.S., U.K., and Ireland are removed
from the sample, the remaining set of European and Scandinavian markets do show some tendency
toward reduced dispersion.  If we restrict the sample of countries to the same six used in the Big
Mac, we see significantly lower dispersion over time.
What do we take away from the reported evidence on price dispersion?  Basically, that there is
little evidence in the data that product markets in developed economies have become more closely
linked in the 1970s and 1980s.  That may be a result of the fact that this set of countries was
already fairly integrated by the 1970s.  We do note that with the Big Mac and The Economist there
is some evidence that countries of Europe may be more closely linked today than they were ten or
20 years ago.  This is not surprising.
3b  The Behavior of Relative Prices
Our second approach to looking for integration of national economies in price data is to
examine whether countries seem to be converging toward a common set of internal relative prices.
This approach is appropriate for two reasons.  First, resource-allocation decisions within a country
are a function of relative prices.  Second, the best source of information on internal relative prices
for fairly detailed product categories is found in the International Comparisons Project data.  This
collection effort was spearheaded by a group of scholars that included Robert Lipsey.
While the ICP data exist in principle for many countries at five year intervals from 1970 to the
present, we were only able to obtain the data for 1975, 1980, and 1985.  We focus on the two
endpoints and ask whether the relative prices within countries are converging toward a common
benchmark.  This requires a choice of benchmark.  Ideally one would like a “world price” that
would prevail in an open market.  By definition, this does not exist.  Instead, we pick individual
countries as a benchmark:  first the United States, then Germany.13
To measure variation relative to the base country, we first normalize the data by multiplying
each country's price for a given product by the reciprocal of the base-country price of that product.
This is done for all products, ensuring that the price vector for the base country is a vector of ones.
For each other country in the sample, we compute the coefficient of variation of the prices across
individual products.  If the country has a relative price structure identical to the base country, the
CV will equal zero, since the price vector will be a constant.  Specifically, each element of the price
vector for a particular country would be equal to the exchange rate (local currency per unit of base
country currency) between the particular country and the base country that prevailed for this set of
products.  Since that exchange rate need not equal the actual market exchange rate, prices in the
two countries need not be equal to have a common relative price structure.5  On the other hand, as
prices within a country depart from the cross-category mean price, the coefficient of variation rises.
Table 5 reports the coefficient of variation of internal relative prices for 17 countries in 1975
and 1985 benchmarked against the U.S. relative price structure.  The CV is calculated for two
separate groupings of goods—producer goods and consumer goods—and for the total.6  The
measure for producer goods is based on a sample of only three products and should be judged
accordingly.  The cross-country variation in the CVs seems to correlate with stages of economic
development.  Most developed countries in the sample have lower CVs than the less developed
countries, which probably is in part a reflection of the extent to which product market distortions in
the traded goods sector can undermine development.7  It may also reflect the different degrees of
non-traded services included product prices, especially for certain consumer goods.
Turning to the time dimension of the U.S.-benchmarked sample, there is a large decline in the
calculated CVs between 1975 and 1985 for Korea and India, and to a lesser extent for Japan,
Belgium, and France.  This suggests some convergence toward common relative prices between
5 It is easy to imagine how a sudden currency swing might cause systematic violations in the law of one price without
necessarily altering the relative price structure between two markets.
6 Note that the CV for the total is not equal to the average of the two subgroups.  This is primarily because the two
subgroups may have different means.  Looking within the subgroup does not capture this additional source of change in the
overall coefficient of variation.
7 The raw data also reveal another interesting feature: the less developed countries tend to have higher relative prices for
producer vs. consumer goods relative to the United States.  Other developed countries distortions relative to U.S. prices
seem to be unrelated to the broad groupings of producer and consumer goods.14
the United States and these countries.  On the other hand, the CVs for Philippines and Thailand
increase by large amounts between the two periods, suggesting a movement toward more diverse
relative prices vis-à-vis the United States.  Overall, this relative price evidence shows that linkages
are much closer between the United States and the other developed countries than they are between
the United States and developing counties.  Furthermore, the big movements in relative prices
suggest convergence or roughly no change with respect to some developed countries, while there
are signs of convergence and divergence with respect to the set of developing countries.
Turning to the German benchmarked sample, one feature that stands out is how small the CVs
are vis-à-vis other Continental European countries.  It seems that relative prices within Europe
were already quite close to the relative prices in Germany.  The only notable changes among this
set of countries were declines by Austria and Italy.  Price dispersion is somewhat greater vis-à-vis
the United Kingdom and Ireland, with only slight declines in the CVs over the decade.  Looking
outside European markets, we see that CVs declined markedly for Japan, Kenya, Korea, and the
United States.  They rose for Philippines, Poland, and Thailand.  This evidence seems broadly
consistent with what was observed in the U.S. sample.  Relative prices are much more similar
within the developed economies, and the main tendency among developed markets is toward
further convergence of prices.  However, with developing countries, we see cases of both
convergence and divergence over this decade.
Taken together, the totality of price evidence we have examined here points to increased
linkages between the developed economies over recent decades, especially within the European
markets, which were already quite closely integrated with each other.  It is more difficult to tell
what the price evidence says about integration between developed and developing countries, partly
due to lack of data.  For the data we have at present, the results are mixed.
4  Evidence From Quantities
4a  Market "Thickness":  Evidence from Trade Flows
Our first quantity-based integration measure looks at how "thick" product markets are in terms
of breadth of trade flows.  Define the categorical variable Zijkt to be equal to one if country j has15
some positive value of exports to country k in industry i during year t, and zero otherwise.  If there
are N countries in the world at time t, then for each industry i there can be up to [(N)x(N-1)] total
bilateral trade flows.  One possible measure of market "thickness" might be the share of total
possible bilateral trade flows for which trade actually happens.  This thickness measure can be
calculated for each industry-year as follows.
(1) qit  º  ( åjåk¹jZijkt
[(N)x(N-1)]t)
By construction, the thickness measure qit ranges from zero to one and reports the share of total
possible bilateral trade "hits" in which trade actually happened.  If every (no) country-pair
worldwide has two-way trade in industry i at time t, then qit equals one (zero).  We interpret
higher values of qit to indicate a thicker world market.  In accounting for the incidence of trade
(i.e., because Zijkt is categorical), note that this measure does not incorporate any information
about trade volumes.  Given this property, we intend for this measure to capture the
competitiveness of product markets under the assumption that competitiveness depends "on the
margin" on the incidence of trade regardless of the volume of that trade.  We hypothesize that
globalization might increase market thickness over time, insofar as lower trade barriers permit more
bilateral trade hits.  Of course, lower barriers might have countervailing effects as well:  if national
production mixes become more specialized, for some industries there might be fewer exporters and
thus fewer bilateral trade hits.  Whatever the case, we think the qit measure is informative.
To construct qit we use the world trade data in Feenstra, Lipsey, and Bowen (1997) .  These
data cover 34 manufacturing industries (as defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis) from
1970 through 1992.  We try two different sets of countries:  the 24 original OECD countries, and
"the world" defined as 122 countries with trade data available for all 23 years of the sample.  In
addition, each observation of qit from the world group of countries is decomposed into four
components:  exports from an OECD country to another OECD country; exports from an OECD
country to a non-OECD country; exports from a non-OECD country to a non-OECD country; and
exports from a non-OECD country to an OECD country.  That is, for each industry-year
observation of the world sample:16
(2) qit  =  qioot + qiont + qinot + qinnt  .
Each of the four components is constructed by varying the countries j and k in Zijkt.  For example,
for qiont the set of j exporting countries is the OECD and the set of k importing countries is the
non-OECD.  By keeping N=122 for all four components we end up with equation (2).  With this
decomposition, we can see how changes in qit are accounted for by major country groupings.8
Table 7 reports some summary statistics for the OECD sample, the world sample, and the four
components of the world sample.  Note that on average, markets are much thicker within the
OECD sample than within the broader sample.  This squares with the general fact that most world
trade is among OECD countries.  Within the world sample, note that total exports from non-OECD
countries account for about two-thirds of all bilateral trade "hits."  These summary statistics mask a
lot of heterogeneity across industries.  Table 8 reports the mean thickness indexes for all 34
industries for both the OECD and full-world samples.  Over the full time series, in both samples
Tobacco Products is the thinnest market (0.53 in the OECD, 0.07 in the world) while
Miscellaneous Food Products is the thickest market (0.97 in the OECD, 0.31 in the world).
To see how market thickness has evolved over time, we pooled the industry thickness
measures and regressed them on a full set of industry dummy variables (which control for time-
invariant differences in market integration across industries) and a time trend:
(3) qit =  a(ID)i + bt + eit  ,
where eit is an additive error term.  For both our thickness measures (OECD and world) the time
trend in equation (3) had a significantly positive coefficient estimate, suggesting that markets have
been thickening over time.  Regressions with a time trend, however, do not allow us to see
whether the pace of integration has varied over time.  To do this we replace the time trend in
equation (3) with a full set of time dummies and estimate equation (3').
(3') qit =  a(ID)i + b(TD)t + uit
8 One concern we have in constructing our trade-thickness measures is whether the raw data contain threshold levels of trade
required for a non-zero entry and, relatedly, how these threshold levels change over time.  Any discrete changes in
thresholds might cause discrete changes in trade thickness.  The available data documentation did not flag any problems
here, but we highlight the issue nevertheless.17
Table 9 reports the parameter estimates on the time dummies from equation (3') using the
world sample and all six thickness measures:  those from the OECD sample, those from the world
sample, and the four world components as described in equation (2).  The key message of Table 9
is that the market thickening process looked very different in the 1970s and 1980s.  During the
1970s the coefficients on the time dummies increased almost uniformly for all six thickness
measures.  This indicates that market thickening proceeded continually throughout the 1970s.
The 1980s looked very different, however.  After 1979 the coefficients on the time dummies
decreased for some time, and only after some additional time did they return to their 1979 level.
This suggests that market thickening proceeded much less uniformly during the 1980s.  The extent
of this thickening slowdown varies among thickness measures.  Among the OECD countries the
slowdown lasted the shortest period:  for the OECD-sample qit the time dummies return to their
1979 levels in 1984, and for qioot the 1979 level held steady until 1985.  Trade flows involving
non-OECD countries took longer to rebound--particularly exports from non-OECD countries.  For
the world-sample qit the time dummies do not return to the 1979 level until 1988.  The other three
components of the world-sample qit returned as follows:  qiont 1986, qinot 1989, and qinnt 1988.
Figure 2 summarizes the difference across decades for all manufacturing together by averaging qit
across all 34 industries in each year.  The rise in the 1970s and subsequent stalling in the 1980s is
clear.  Figure 3 shows the same pattern for a single industry, Textiles and Apparel.  The pattern in
this figure is repeated in many other industries; altogether they give rise to Figure 2.
In interpreting regression results from (3') as evidence of integration, we reiterate our caveat
that our analysis does not link outcomes back to trade barriers.  Without these links we cannot rule
out that changes in outcomes are caused by forces other than declining barriers, such as economic
growth.  To address this issue we reestimated equation (3') by adding in additional regressors to
control for forces affecting qit other than declining barriers as proxied by time dummies.  Our
choice of regressors, as with our empirical strategy more generally, does not follow from a specific
trade model.  Instead, we chose measures aimed at capturing cross-country differences in
endowments, tastes, technology, and the resulting international dispersion of production.18
In Table 10 we report estimation results for equation (3') augmented by three alternative
controls:  cross-country dispersion in capital-to-labor endowment ratios; cross-country dispersion
in GDP per worker; and cross-country dispersion in industry production.  We intend for these
three controls to capture the role of endowments, tastes and technology, and the equilibrium
international dispersion of production, respectively.  The first two controls vary only over time;
both come from the Penn World Tables assembled by Summers and Heston (1997).  The third
control is from UNIDO (1995); it varies by both time and industry.  For each control, the
dispersion of the variable of interest is constructed as the standard deviation of the log of that
variable calculated by pooling across the relevant set of countries (i.e., the set of countries used in
the thickness measure -- either the OECD or the 122 countries in "the world").9
Table 10 reports results for six regressions:  three for the OECD and three for the world, each
estimates of equation (3') plus one of the control regressors.10  The key message of this table is
that the time-series patterns in our thickness measures appear robust to controlling for other
plausible determinants of thickness.  In all but one case, the general pattern remains of rising
thickness over the 1970s followed by a decline and then recovery in thickness over part or most of
the 1980s.  Only for the OECD sample using endowment dispersion do we find a much shorter
decline period.  As for the controls, both endowment and per capita GDP dispersion were very
significantly positive in all specifications.  The industry-output control was significantly positive at
the 10% level for the OECD sample, but significantly negative at that level for the world sample.
Finally, Table 11 reports how the worldwide trade thickening from 1970 to 1992 was allocated
across the four components in equation (2).  For each of the four components Table 11 reports the
level in 1970 and 1992, the level change between 1970 and 1992, and finally the share of the total
level change in qit accounted for by that component, all averaged in each year across the 35
industries.  Slightly less than half of the total increase in qit was accounted for by trade among
9 For our third control, the UNIDO data contain 28 3-digit ISIC manufacturing industries.  Our thickness measures are
constructed for the 34 BEA manufacturing industries.  We matched the UNIDO industries to the BEA industries as best we
could without a true concordance; accordingly, we acknowledge that this procedure introduced some measurement error.
10 For the world sample, for brevity we report using just total world trade hits thickness measure -- i.e., only the left-hand
side of equation (2).19
non-OECD countries.  About 28% was accounted for by exports from the OECD to non-OECD
countries, while another 22% was accounted for by trade in the other direction.  Only about 5% of
the total increase was accounted for by trade among OECD countries.
4b  The Geographic Dispersion of Production
Our second quantity-based integration measure is the degree of production concentration
worldwide, measured with industry-year Herfindahl indexes of production.  Let Xjit be the output
of country j in industry i at time t.  Then we define the following:
(4) HerfXit  º  åj( Xjit
Xworldit)2  .
By construction, HerfXit  ranges from zero to one.  It equals one if a single country produces
all the world's output in some industry-year, and it approaches zero as world production is spread
evenly across all countries.  In a standard HO model HerfXit should increase with integration as
world production becomes more specialized according to comparative advantage.  In an HO-
fragmentation world HerfXit  might decline as production activities within industries spread across
more countries.  To construct HerfXit we use data from UNIDO (1995) covering the 28 3-digit
ISIC manufacturing industries from 1970 through 1992, with "the world" defined as all countries
with output data available for all 23 years of the sample.  We have information on both value added
and gross output; for completeness we use both, and thus measure Xjit in terms of either value
added or gross output.11
Table 12 reports summary statistics for the two Herfindahl indexes.  Note that, on average,
HerfXit is slightly larger for value-added output than for gross output.  To see how these indexes
evolved over time we pooled all observations and regressed each HerfXit on a full set of industry
dummy variables (which control for time-invariant differences in market integration across
industries) and a time trend:
(5) HerfXit =  a(ID)i + bt + eit  ,
11 Strictly speaking, the standard HO model refers to industry net outputs.  We have data only on value added and gross
output, and are assuming that the Herfindahl indexes rise for these output measures whenever it rises in terms of net output.20
where eit is an additive error term.  For both our output measures the time trend in equation (5) had
a significantly negative coefficient estimate, suggesting that world production has become less
concentrated over time.  As before, however, regressions with a time trend do not allow us to see
whether the pace of integration has varied over time.  To do this we estimate equation (6).
(6) HerfXit =  a(ID)i + b(TD)t + uit  ,
where as before TD is a full set of time dummies.
Table 13 reports the parameter estimates on the time dummies from equation (6) for both
measures of HerfXit.  For each measure, Table 13 also reports results for equation (6) modified by
adding the world-endowment-dispersion control.  As with trade thickness here, too, the 1970s and
1980s look different.  Both measures of HerfXit had uniformly declining time dummies during the
1970s.  But this trend reversed after 1980, with the time dummies increasing for several years
before coming down again.  This pattern holds even controlling for the world distribution of
endowments (similar results obtained using the other controls described earlier; for brevity we omit
these).  Figure 4 visualizes the difference across decades for all manufacturing together by
averaging the gross-output HerfXit across all 28 industries in each year.  The fall in the 1970s and
subsequent stalling in the 1980s is clear.
What these time-series patterns in HerfXit say about integration depends on which framework
is applied.  From the standard HO perspective the patterns suggest no integration in the 1970s,
then greater integration in the 1980s.  From the HO-fragmentation perspective the opposite is
suggested:  marked integration during the 1970s and then very little integration in the 1980s.  We
note that this later interpretation is consistent with the trade-thickness evidence.
4c  Production Fragmentation:  Evidence from Value Added and Gross Output
Our final quantity-based integration measure is the ratio of value added to gross output within
industries.  With the UNIDO data we can construct this ratio for each industry-year, VAGOit,
again for all 28 3-digit ISIC manufacturing industries from 1970 through 1992.  In the full sample
VAGOit had a mean value of 0.376 (with a standard deviation of 0.102).  In the HO-fragmentation21
world, with integration VAGOit should decline as countries focus on narrower mixes of activities
within industries and import other activities as intermediate inputs.  To test this we estimate
(7) VAGOit =  a(ID)i + b(TD)t + uit  ,
where as before TD is a full set of time dummies.  An important data caveat here is that VAGOit
can change because of changing reliance on domestic intermediate inputs, not just foreign inputs.
We have no data on imported intermediate inputs; our results should be interpreted accordingly.
Table 14 reports the parameter estimates on the time dummies from equation (7); it also reports
results for equation (7) modified by adding the world-endowment-dispersion control.  Again the
1970s and 1980s look different.  With or without the control for endowments, the time dummies in
equation (7) generally declined during the 1970s, then plateaued during the 1980s and increased
sharply the last few years.  Figure 5 visualizes these trends by averaging VAGOit across all 28
industries in each year.  The fall in the 1970s and subsequent stalling is clear.
4d  Summary of Quantity Evidence
Viewed from the HO-fragmentation perspective, our quantity evidence suggests that product
markets have integrated since 1970 but at quite different rates over time.  There was sizable, steady
integration during the 1970s.  But the 1980s had very little integration overall:  integration actually
reversed initially, only to recover this reversal by the end of the decade.  We note that these decade
differences broadly match the trend in U.S. natural trade barriers in Figure 1.  These differences
also have a parallel in the recent product-price studies liking rising U.S. wage inequality with
Stolper-Samuelson price effects.  The consensus of these studies is that during the 1970s the U.S.
relative price of unskilled-labor-intensive products declined but that this decline did not continue
during the 1980s.  These price changes suggest that the U.S. economy liberalized during the 1970s
but not the 1980s -- a split in timing which matches our quantity evidence.
In interpreting these price and quantity measures as evidence of integration, we reiterate our
caveat that these measures do not link outcomes back to trade barriers.  Without these links we
cannot rule out that changes in outcomes are caused by forces other than declining barriers, such as
economic growth.  In our regression analysis we have included some first-pass controls for these22
other forces, such as cross-country dispersion of endowments and per capita income.  Our
outcomes-based measures of integration look quite similar with and without these controls, so we
hope that these measures reflect something about the underlying integration process.
5  Conclusion
In this paper we have presented some new price- and quantity-based measures of product-
market integration.  Our price measures do not permit very strong conclusions about the changing
nature of market integration.  Both the absolute and relative price information available does
confirm that European countries seem to be moving toward a single market.  There is little to
suggest convergence toward common prices between Europe and the United States or United
Kingdom, however.  We have limited price data on linkages between developed and developing
countries.  The developing-country evidence is mixed:  some countries seem to converge in relative
prices but others do not.  Our quantity evidence suggests that product markets have integrated since
1970, but at quite different rates over time.  There was sizable, steady integration during the
1970s.  But the 1980s had much less integration overall:  it reversed initially and then recovered.
These new measures we regard as a first step in trying to quantify more accurately the process
of product-market integration.  With refinement, we think measures like these will help researchers
understand the links between integration and domestic-economy outcomes.23
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Figure 1
Declining Political and Natural Trade Barriers
Year (2-digit)
 Average U.S. Tariff Rate  Average U.S. Transport Cost






Notes:  Data cover all U.S. manufacturing.  Tariff rate is defined as total manufacturing duties collected divided by
total manufacturing f.o.b. imports.  Transportation cost is defined as the difference between total manufacturing
imports valued c.i.f. and f.o.b. divided by total manufacturing f.o.b. imports.











Notes:  Each year plots the thickness of world trade (as defined in Equation (1)) averaged across all 34 manufacturing
industries.









Notes:  Each year plots the thickness of world trade (as defined in Equation (1)) for the industry Textiles and Apparel.









Notes:  Each year plots the dispersion of world production (as defined in Equation (4)) averaged across all 28
manufacturing industries.
Source:  Unido (1995).28
Figure 5








Notes:  Each year plots the ratio of value added to gross output averaged across all 28 manufacturing industries.
Source:  Unido (1995).29
Table 1:  Trends in U.S. Export-Price Dispersion
Industry Trend Std. Error t-statistic
Aluminum Foil 0.0383 0.0039 9.78
Aluminum Oxide -0.0274 0.0111 -2.47
Integrated Circuit 0.0068 0.0053 1.28
Kraft Linerboard Paper -0.0036 0.0020 -1.77
Autos, over 8 cyl. 0.0108 0.0043 2.51
Primary Cell Batteries 0.0071 0.0203 0.35
Photocopier Paper 0.0040 0.0067 0.6
Putty 0.0054 0.0048 1.14
Cigarettes 0.0102 0.0015 6.74
Industrial Lacquers 0.0097 0.0059 1.63
Nitrile Rubber -0.0053 0.0056 -0.96
Raw Cotton 0.0060 0.0059 1.02
Autos, under 8 cyl. 0.0023 0.0012 1.92
Titanium Dioxide 0.0162 0.0128 1.26
Bourbon Whiskey -0.0086 0.0035 -2.47
Yellow Corn 0.1880 0.0320 5.87
Notes:  Each trend is the coefficient estimate of annual export-price dispersion regressed on a time trend.  Annual
export-price dispersion is measured as the coefficient of variation in bilateral U.S. export unit values across all
destination markets.  Each regression contains 14 observations.
Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce.30
Table 2:  Trends in German Export-Price Dispersion
Industry Trend Std. Error t-statistic
Aluminum Oxide -0.0080 0.0086 -0.92
Autos, 1.5 – 2 L 0.0095 0.0024 3.94
Autos, 2 – 3 L -0.0058 0.0012 -4.65
Autos, over 3 L -0.0091 0.0044 -2.07
Glykocides 0.0052 0.0045 1.16
Induction Furnaces -0.0169 0.0065 -2.60
Record Players -0.0136 0.0077 -1.78
Razor Blades 0.0055 0.0044 1.24
Pneumatic Tires -0.0005 0.0021 -0.22
Platinum Plating 0.0117 0.0021 5.51
Aluminum Hydroxide 0.0087 0.0034 2.52
Autos, under 1.5 L 0.0193 0.0069 2.80
Titanium Pigment -0.0143 0.0033 -4.28
Titanium Dioxide 0.0052 0.0087 0.60
Aldehyde Derivatives -0.0211 0.0207 -1.02
Hydrocarbons -0.0066 0.0055 -1.19
Hydrogen 0.0080 0.0022 3.67
Vitamin A 0.0197 0.0078 2.54
Vitamin C -0.0022 0.0023 -0.94
Beer -0.0081 0.0023 -3.48
Synthetic Dyes -0.0026 0.0027 -0.97
Special Dyes 0.0090 0.0026 3.41
Glazed Ceramic Tiles -0.0021 0.0030 -0.72
Calcium -0.0234 0.0099 -2.36
Olive Oil -0.0064 0.0045 -1.42
Sandals 0.0332 0.0047 7.08
Semi-Finished Platinum 0.0059 0.0036 1.63
Cocoa Powder -0.0013 0.0045 -0.29
Women’s Blouses 0.0322 0.0048 6.69
Notes:  Each trend is the coefficient estimate of annual export-price dispersion regressed on a time trend.  Annual
export-price dispersion is measured as the coefficient of variation in bilateral German export unit values across all
destination markets.
Source:  Statistisches Bundesamt.31
Table 3:  Trends in Price Convergence for the Big Mac, 1986-1997
Country Group Trend Std. Error t-statistic
“Big Mac 12”  -0.0014 0.0023 -0.62
“Big Mac 6”  -0.0029 0.0026 -1.14
“Big Mac 5”  -0.0069 0.0020 -3.44
Notes:  Each trend is the coefficient estimate of annual price dispersion regressed on a time trend.
Annual price dispersion is measured as the coefficient of variation in Big Mac prices across all
countries in the Country Group.  Country Groups are defined in the text.
Source:  The Economist magazine.
Table 4:  Trends in Price Convergence for The Economist, 1961-1991
Country Group Trend Std. Error t-statistic
“Economist 11”  0.0003 0.0010 0.25
“Economist 10”  0.0005 0.0010 0.47
“Economist 8”  -0.0014 0.0008 -1.77
“Big Mac 6” -0.0049 0.0012 -4.01
“Big Mac 5” -0.0028 0.0014 -1.94
Notes:  Each trend is the coefficient estimate of annual price dispersion regressed on a time trend.
Annual price dispersion is measured as the coefficient of variation in  prices of The Economist
across all countries in the Country Group.  Country Groups are defined in the text.
Source:  The Economist magazine.32
Table 5
Dispersion in National Relative Prices
Relative to U.S. Relative Prices
1975 1985
Country All Goods Cons Goods Prod Goods All Goods Cons Goods Prod Goods
Austria 0.23 0.20 0.10 0.21 0.22 0.18
Belgium 0.28 0.30 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.19
Denmark 0.27 0.29 0.20 0.30 0.30 0.28
France 0.26 0.28 0.09 0.19 0.19 0.20
Germany 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.16
India 0.69 0.79 0.07 0.42 0.41 0.13
Ireland 0.33 0.36 0.15 0.31 0.33 0.27
Italy 0.30 0.31 0.13 0.26 0.28 0.20
Japan 0.37 0.37 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.15
Kenya 0.47 0.42 0.20 0.46 0.48 NA
Korea 0.76 0.83 0.20 0.38 0.39 0.34
Netherlands 0.23 0.22 0.17 0.29 0.31 0.18
Philippines 0.61 0.61 0.20 0.88 0.36 1.02
Poland 0.37 0.41 0.12 0.35 0.34 0.41
Spain 0.26 0.25 0.04 0.26 0.26 0.22
Thailand 0.48 0.42 0.12 0.60 0.47 0.16
United Kingdom 0.35 0.38 0.06 0.30 0.31 0.26
Notes:  Each cell reports the coefficient of variation in the country's price basket.  For each product, price levels have been
normalized worldwide such that the U.S. price equals one.
Source:  International Comparison Program, from The World Bank (1993).33
Table 6
Dispersion in National Relative Prices
Relative to German Relative Prices
1975 1985
Country All Goods Cons Goods Prod Goods All Goods Cons Goods Prod Goods
Austria 0.22 0.19 0.28 0.12 0.12 0.14
Belgium 0.16 0.17 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.05
Denmark 0.18 0.16 0.31 0.19 0.18 0.27
France 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.05
India 0.61 0.69 0.14 0.58 0.63 0.26
Ireland 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.26 0.28 0.21
Italy 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.11
Japan 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.34 0.35 0.03
Kenya 0.46 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 NA
Korea 0.96 1.03 0.30 0.48 0.51 0.40
Netherlands 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.08
Philippines 0.60 0.61 0.37 0.97 0.48 1.09
Poland 0.35 0.37 0.29 0.46 0.47 0.39
Spain 0.44 0.48 0.21 0.25 0.24 0.20
Thailand 0.49 0.52 0.16 0.73 0.69 0.27
United Kingdom 0.25 0.27 0.15 0.21 0.22 0.20
United States 0.31 0.32 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.14
Notes:  Each cell reports the coefficient of variation in the country's price basket.  For each product, price levels have been
normalized worldwide such that the German price equals one.




Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
qit OECD 0.851 0.088 0.496 0.994
qit World 0.200 0.054 0.061 0.362
qioot 0.029 0.003 0.017 0.034
qiont 0.035 0.016 0.005 0.089
qinot 0.082 0.018 0.028 0.122
qinnt 0.054 0.022 0.009 0.135
Notes:  These variables are trade-thickness measures as defined by equations (1) and (2) in the text.
The sample contains 782 observations (34 industries x 23 years).
Source:  Feenstra, Lipsey, and Bowen (1997).35
Table 8
Average Trade-Thickness Measures by Industry
Industry Name qit OECD qit World
Grain-Mill and Bakery Products 0.780 0.147
Beverages 0.832 0.162
Tobacco Products 0.535 0.072
Miscellaneous Food Products 0.974 0.308
Apparel and Textile Products 0.967 0.307
Leather Products 0.877 0.200
Pulp, Paper, and Board Mills 0.801 0.168
Other Paper Products 0.834 0.177
Printing and Publishing 0.874 0.188
Drugs 0.863 0.218
Soaps, Cleaners, and Toilet Goods 0.789 0.153
Agricultural Chemicals 0.672 0.145
Industrial Chemicals and Synthetics 0.914 0.258
Other Chemical Products  0.885 0.218
Rubber Products 0.852 0.197
Miscellaneous Plastic Products 0.889 0.191
Ferrous Metal Products 0.836 0.182
Nonferrous Metal Products 0.908 0.219
Fabricated Metal Products 0.926 0.257
Farm and Garden Machinery 0.785 0.124
Construction, Mining, and Related Machinery 0.836 0.189
Computer and Office Equipment 0.835 0.167
Other Nonelectric Machinery 0.932 0.278
Household Appliances 0.841 0.177
Audio, Video, and Communication Equipment 0.892 0.222
Electronic Components and Accesories 0.762 0.115
Other Electrical Machinery 0.897 0.236
Motor Vehicles and Equipment 0.858 0.228
Other Transportation Equipment 0.839 0.188
Lumber, Wood, Furniture, and Fixtures 0.857 0.214
Glass Products 0.845 0.178
Stone, Clay and Other Mineral Products 0.889 0.210
Instruments and Related Products 0.898 0.248
Other Manufactures 0.948 0.254
Notes:  These variables are average trade-thickness measures as defined by equation (1) in the text.
The sample contains 782 observations (34 industries x 23 years).




Thickness Measure qit OECD qit World qioot qiont qinot qinnt
1970 0.899 0.223 0.031 0.049 0.081 0.062
1971 0.909 0.227 0.031 0.050 0.082 0.064
1972 0.918 0.232 0.031 0.051 0.083 0.066
1973 0.933 0.239 0.032 0.054 0.085 0.068
1974 0.936 0.244 0.032 0.054 0.086 0.071
1975 0.933 0.246 0.032 0.055 0.087 0.073
1976 0.935 0.248 0.032 0.055 0.087 0.074
1977 0.935 0.253 0.032 0.056 0.089 0.076
1978 0.939 0.264 0.032 0.058 0.095 0.079
1979 0.942 0.265 0.032 0.059 0.095 0.079
1980 0.929 0.248 0.032 0.054 0.089 0.072
1981 0.933 0.248 0.032 0.055 0.089 0.072
1982 0.933 0.247 0.032 0.055 0.090 0.070
1983 0.936 0.244 0.032 0.055 0.089 0.068
1984 0.944 0.244 0.032 0.055 0.090 0.066
1985 0.951 0.249 0.033 0.056 0.092 0.068
1986 0.962 0.256 0.033 0.059 0.092 0.072
1987 0.971 0.263 0.033 0.061 0.094 0.075
1988 0.983 0.269 0.034 0.064 0.093 0.079
1989 0.989 0.275 0.034 0.064 0.095 0.081
1990 0.998 0.283 0.034 0.065 0.096 0.087
1991 1.001 0.284 0.034 0.065 0.095 0.089
1992 1.004 0.293 0.034 0.068 0.098 0.093
Notes:  Each column is a different trade-thickness measure as defined in equations (1) and (2) in the text.  For each
thickness measure, each row reports the coefficient estimate on that year's time dummy variable from regression
equation (3').  All regressions contain 782 observations.





Thickness Measure qit OECD qit OECD qit OECD qit World qit World qit World
1970 N.A. N.A. 0.876 -0.055 N.A. 0.232
1971 0.030 0.052 0.888 -0.049 0.005 0.236
1972 0.058 0.086 0.898 -0.042 0.007 0.240
1973 0.096 0.107 0.914 -0.033 0.012 0.246
1974 0.118 0.129 0.918 -0.026 0.017 0.251
1975 0.126 0.167 0.916 -0.022 0.019 0.253
1976 0.139 0.182 0.917 -0.019 0.018 0.255
1977 0.148 0.207 0.918 -0.012 0.024 0.260
1978 0.168 0.205 0.922 0.001 0.036 0.270
1979 0.180 0.200 0.926 0.006 0.037 0.272
1980 0.174 0.182 0.914 -0.008 0.012 0.254
1981 0.184 0.186 0.917 -0.006 0.017 0.255
1982 0.189 0.200 0.917 -0.007 0.018 0.253
1983 0.196 0.204 0.919 -0.011 0.016 0.251
1984 0.205 0.200 0.927 -0.013 0.015 0.251
1985 0.209 0.209 0.935 -0.011 0.024 0.256
1986 0.220 0.235 0.947 -0.002 0.029 0.263
1987 0.229 0.260 0.956 -0.001 0.036 0.269
1988 0.241 0.268 0.968 0.001 0.039 0.275
1989 0.252 0.282 0.974 0.007 0.044 0.281
1990 0.263 0.341 0.982 0.012 0.055 0.290
1991 0.294 N.A. 0.986 0.002 N.A. 0.291
1992 0.339 N.A. 0.988 N.A. N.A. 0.300
Control Regressor Endowments Per Capita GDP Output Endowments Per Capita GDP Output
Notes:  Each column is a different trade-thickness measure as defined in equation (1) in the text.  For each thickness
measure, each row reports the coefficient estimate on that year's time dummy variable from regression equation (3')
expanded to include the control regressor listed in the bottom row.  Exact definitions of control variables are given in
the text.  All regressions contain 782 observations.
Source:  Feenstra, Lipsey, and Bowen (1997), Summers and Heston (1997), Unido (1995).38
Table 11
Changes in World Trade Thickness
Thickness Measure qioot qiont qinot qinnt
Level in 1970 0.028 0.028 0.074 0.044
Level in 1992 0.031 0.048 0.090 0.075
D, 70-92 0.003 0.020 0.016 0.031
Share of Dqit world 0.054 0.284 0.223 0.439
Notes:  These levels and changes for each measure are averaged across all 34 industries in the sample.  The
thickness measures are defined in equation (2).




Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max
Value-Added HerfXit 0.164 0.063 0.064 0.465
Gross-Output HerfXit 0.133 0.045 0.056 0.346
Notes:  These variables are Herfindahl indexes of production dispersion as defined by equation (4)
in the text.  The sample contains 644 observations (28 industries x 23 years).




Dispersion Gross-Output  Gross-Output Value-Added Value-Added
 Measure HerfXit HerfXit HerfXit HerfXit
1970 0.233 0.081 0.255 0.078
1971 0.214 0.063 0.250 0.074
1972 0.206 0.057 0.242 0.067
1973 0.195 0.046 0.222 0.048
1974 0.185 0.038 0.211 0.038
1975 0.179 0.032 0.198 0.027
1976 0.181 0.035 0.205 0.034
1977 0.174 0.030 0.206 0.036
1978 0.171 0.027 0.203 0.035
1979 0.164 0.022 0.197 0.031
1980 0.157 0.018 0.181 0.017
1981 0.166 0.027 0.196 0.033
1982 0.167 0.028 0.200 0.037
1983 0.171 0.031 0.203 0.039
1984 0.172 0.031 0.209 0.044
1985 0.172 0.030 0.210 0.044
1986 0.159 0.018 0.192 0.026
1987 0.158 0.014 0.193 0.024
1988 0.156 0.009 0.187 0.016
1989 0.152 0.006 0.185 0.013
1990 0.154 0.006 0.180 0.006
1991 0.148 0.006 0.181 0.000
1992 0.160 N.A. 0.187 N.A.
Control Regressor None Endowments None Endowments
Notes:  Each column is a Herfindahl index of production dispersion as defined in equation (4) in the text.  For each
dispersion measure, each row reports the coefficient estimate on that year's time dummy variable from regression
equation (6).  Exact definition of control variable is given in the text.  All regressions contain 644 observations.
Source:  Unido (1995) and Summers and Heston (1997).40
Table 14
Time-Series Trends in
World (Value Added/Gross Output) Dispersion
























Control Regressor None Endowments
Notes:  Each row reports the coefficient estimate on that year's time dummy variable from regression equation (7),
where the dependent variable is the ratio of value added to gross output.  Exact definition of control variable is given
in the text.  All regressions contain 644 observations.
Source:  Unido (1995) and Summers and Heston (1997)..